Husserl on formal mathematics and how it relates to intuition

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This talk aims to show how mathematics in Husserl's view is related to intuition of objects. I will discuss Husserl's view of mathematics as presented in Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929)—in Husserl's own view his "most mature, if too concentrated" work, in which he claims to have achieved a "definitive clarification of the sense of pure formal mathematics." Pure formal mathematics is understood as modern structural mathematics, which in Husserl's view is given with distinct evidence (as opposed to clear evidence). The talk will first elaborate on the nature of distinct evidence, with which the non-contradictory theories are given. Husserl further claims that whereas the mathematicians are free to proceed as they wish, the "logically" minded mathematicians, i.e., the ones with foundational interests should worry about how mathematics is related to judgments about individual objects. To show this, Husserl uses a (normalizable) judgement theory that reveals a "sense-genesis" of the more complex judgments. The nature of judgment-theory will be discussed in comparison with few present day approaches, in particular with intuitionistic type theory. The talk will then further elaborate on the nature of distinct evidence and on how Husserl thinks that even it is ultimately related to judgments about objects, even though considered as formalized.